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Abstract. We present the first protocol for the anonymous transmission of a quantum state that is
information-theoretically secure against an active adversary, without any assumption on the number of
corrupt participants. The anonymity of the sender and receiver is perfectly preserved, and the privacy
of the quantum state is protected except with exponentially small probability. Even though a single
corrupt participant can cause the protocol to abort, the quantum state can only be destroyed with
exponentially small probability: if the protocol succeeds, the state is transferred to the receiver and
otherwise it remains in the hands of the sender (provided the receiver is honest).
Keywords: quantum cryptography, multiparty computation, anonymity, dining cryptographers.
1 Introduction
In David Chaum’s classic dining cryptographers scenario [Cha88], a group of cryptographers is
having dinner at a restaurant and it is the case that either one of them has anonymously paid the
dinner bill or the NSA has paid. The task that the cryptographers wish to accomplish is to find
out which of the two cases occurred, without revealing any additional information. The security of
Chaum’s protocol does not rely on any computational assumption, but only on the cryptographers
having access to pairwise private channels and to a broadcast channel. A simple extension to this
protocol allows a single participant, say Alice, to broadcast a message to all the other participants
in such a way that Alice’s identity is information-theoretically protected.
But what if Alice wishes to send a private message to Bob (who is also sitting at the dinner
table), while ensuring the anonymity of both herself and of Bob? This task is called anonymous
message transmission. As an instance of multiparty secure computation, such a protocol can be
accomplished, assuming pairwise private channels and a broadcast channel, as long as a majority of
participants are honest [RB89]. Recently, two of us [BT07] have given a protocol that requires pair-
wise private channels and a broadcast channel, and accomplishes anonymous message transmission
without any assumption on the number of honest participants (the protocol, however, allows even
a single corrupt participant to cause an abort).
Our main contribution is to give the first information-theoretically secure protocol for quantum
anonymous transmission that tolerates any number of corrupt participants. That is, our protocol
allows Alice to send a quantum message to Bob such that both Alice and Bob remain anonymous
(no participant learns the identity of Alice—even if Bob is corrupt—and the identity of Bob remains
known only to Alice), and the quantum message remains private (nothing about it leaks to partic-
ipants other than Bob, unless of course Bob is corrupt). The anonymity of the sender and receiver,
as well as the privacy of the quantum message, are perfect, regardless of the behaviour of cheating
parties, with no need to rely on any assumptions other than the availability of a classical broadcast
channel as well as private authenticated quantum channels between each pair of participants. Our
protocol has features similar to the anonymous (classical) message transmission protocol mentioned
above: we can tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants, but any single corrupt partici-
pant can cause the protocol to abort. However, no private information can be obtained by making
the protocol abort.
Since Alice sends quantum information, we need to address a concern that did not exist in the
context of classical anonymous message transmission: the state to be transmitted should never be
destroyed even if the protocol aborts (unless the receiver is corrupt, since in that case he can follow
honestly the protocol until the very end, and then destroy the successfully transmitted message!).
Because of the no-cloning theorem [WZ82], the sender cannot keep a backup copy of the message
before entering the protocol. Nevertheless, we accomplish this safeguard as part of the main protocol
with a simple and novel notion called fail-safe teleportation.
1.1 Anonymity
Anonymity is a basic cryptographic property whose goal is to hide the identity of the sender or
receiver of a message (or both). It is different from, but often complementary to privacy, which
ensures the confidentiality of a message. Examples of anonymous tasks include sending an anony-
mous letter to one’s love, using an email account with a pseudonym, accessing a web page through a
trusted identity proxy server or blind reviewing of a conference paper. Three approaches to classical
anonymity are generally considered. The first one requires the help of a trusted third party that
forwards messages between participants without revealing the identity of the senders. Anonymiz-
ers [Boy97,GGK+99] belong to this class. The second approach uses chains of untrusted servers
that randomize the ordering of messages. This reordering prevents an outside observer from linking
the sender and the receiver of a particular message. The privacy of messages is generally assured
by a public-key cryptosystem. Chaum’s MixNets [Cha81] are an instance of techniques using this
approach. The third and last approach offers information-theoretic security, assuming resources
such as a broadcast channel and pairwise private channels. Chaum’s dining cryptographers proto-
col [Cha88] is the archetypical example of a protocol in this category.
1.2 Model
In our model, we suppose that each pair of participants shares a private authenticated quantum
channel, which means that a participant can send an authenticated private message (quantum or
classical) to any other participant. Such a channel can be implemented if the participants share
pairwise quantum channels as well as classical secret keys. An extra tool is given to the participants
under the form of a (classical) broadcast channel. This channel guarantees that all participants
receive the same message from a publicly known sender, and that the message is not modified while
in transit.
Two security models are generally considered in secure multiparty computation: honest-but-
curious and malicious. In the honest-but-curious model (also called semi-honest), the participants
are assumed to follow the protocol (thus being honest) but at the same time record all the in-
formation they have seen during its execution (thus being curious). In this model, a protocol is
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said to be secure against a collusion of participants if, by pooling their data, these participants
cannot learn more information than from their inputs and the output of the protocol alone. In the
malicious model, participants may actively cheat and deviate from the original prescription of the
protocol. Cheaters can for instance try to learn information about the input of honest participants
or tamper with the output of the protocol. Formal definitions can be found in Chapter 7 of [Gol04].
Both these models are neatly encapsulated by considering a central entity called an adversary,
which controls some of the participants, rendering them corrupt. The adversary is passive if the
corrupt participants are honest-but-curious, and active if the corrupt participants are malicious. In
this paper, we consider the case of an active adversary that chooses the set of corrupt participants
before the execution of the protocol.
In the scenario that we consider, within a group of n participants, the anonymous sender
communicates a private quantum message to an anonymous receiver. The sender is unknown to
all participants and the receiver is unknown to all participants except to the sender. We give the
following formal definitions, adapted from [CW05]:
Definition 1 (Sender anonymity). A protocol achieves sender anonymity if at the end of the
protocol, the probability that an adversary controlling any number t of participants (excluding the
sender) can correctly guess the identity of the sender is at most 1
n−t
. If the sender is corrupt, then
the protocol vacuously achieves sender anonymity.
Definition 2 (Receiver anonymity). A protocol achieves receiver anonymity if at the end of
the protocol, the probability that an adversary controlling any number t of participants (excluding
the sender and receiver) can correctly guess the identity of the receiver is at most 1
n−t
. If either the
sender or receiver is corrupt, then the protocol vacuously achieves receiver anonymity.
The intuition behind these definitions is that a protocol for completing an anonymous task
should not reveal any information about the identity of the sender or of the receiver. If this prop-
erty is verified, the best an adversary can do at the end of the protocol is to guess at random
their identities. If the sender is corrupt, then there is no sender anonymity to preserve; a similar
observation applies to receiver anonymity. Note however that sender anonymity requires that no
adversary can learn the identity of the sender, even if the receiver is corrupt.
In what follows, we are only interested in protocols that are unconditionally secure in the
information-theoretic sense for the purpose of achieving sender and receiver anonymity. We place
no limit on the number of corrupt participants. It is therefore not surprising that the protocol
could abort if even a single corrupt participant deviates from the prescribed protocol. Even if
the protocol aborts, sender and receiver anonymity, and message privacy are never compromised.
Note that if we had some sort of guarantee that a strict majority of participants is honest, then
anonymous quantum message transmission could be implemented as a special case of quantum
secure multiparty computation [BCG+06].
1.3 Anonymity in the quantum world
The first protocol based on quantum mechanics that allows the anonymous communication of
classical information was proposed by P. Oscar Boykin [Boy02]. In the case of a quantum message,
Matthias Christandl and Stephanie Wehner were first to define the concept of anonymous quantum
message transmission and to give an explicit protocol for solving this task [Weh04,CW05], but
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under the deus ex machina assumption that the n participants share ahead of time entangled state
|+n〉 =
1√
2
|0n〉+ 1√
2
|1n〉. (No mechanism is proposed to verify the validity of that state.) Under
that assumption, their protocol is information-theoretically secure in terms of sender and receiver
anonymity, but malicious participants can alter the transmitted state in a way that will not be
detected by the honest participants.
One key notion introduced in the paper of Christandl and Wehner is that of anonymous entan-
glement. Starting with the assumed n-party entangled state |+n〉, the sender and the receiver end
up sharing a two-party entangled state |+2〉, better known as Bell State |Φ
+〉 = 1√
2
|00〉+ 1√
2
|11〉,
provided the other parties follow the protocol honestly. This entanglement is anonymous because
the sender has chosen with which other party (the receiver) he shares it, but the receiver has no
information concerning the party with which he is entangled. Moreover, the other parties have no
information concerning who are the two entangled parties (assuming the entangled parties are not
corrupt).
A first attempt to accomplish quantum message transmission in the presence of an unlimited
number of corrupt participants without assuming that a trusted state |+n〉 is shared between the
participants before the onset of the protocol was made by Jan Bouda and Josef Sˇprojcar [BSˇ07],
but in a public-receiver model (the sender is anonymous but the receiver is public). The creation
and distribution of a |+n〉 state is an important part of their protocol. From there, they attempt to
establish semi-anonymous entanglement (the identity of one of the entangled parties, the receiver,
is public). However, careful analysis reveals that an active adversary can proceed in such a way
that the probability that the protocol aborts becomes correlated with the identity of the sender,
thus compromising his anonymity. If the protocol requires the receiver to stay quiet in order not
to reveal whether or not the protocol has succeeded, it is true that the anonymity of the sender is
preserved. However, this is very different from the model usually considered in secure multiparty
computation, in which all the participants learn at the end of the protocol whether or not it has
succeeded. More importantly, this approach makes it impossible to preserve the identity of the
sender whenever the receiver is corrupt.
Our own protocol is also based on the establishment of anonymous entanglement between the
sender and the receiver. However, compared to the protocol of Christandl and Wehner, we do
not need to assume an a priori shared |+n〉 state and no malicious attempt at corrupting the
intended final |Φ+〉 state between the sender and the receiver can succeed (except with exponentially
small probability) without causing an abort. It follows that the intended state will be transmitted
faithfully unless the protocol aborts, in which case it will end up intact at the sender’s by virtue
of fail-safe teleportation (unless the receiver is corrupt). Compared with the protocol of Bouda
and Sˇprojcar, our receiver is anonymous and the identity of the sender and the receiver cannot be
correlated with the probability that the protocol aborts, allowing us to achieve perfectly sender
and receiver anonymity according to Definitions 1 and 2.
2 Toolbox
We now survey the classical and quantum tools that are used in our main protocol. Two of us
recently developed several classical secure multiparty protocols [BT07]; we present below some of
the relevant results, which will be used in the next section. All protocols assume pairwise authentic
private classical channels and a broadcast channel. They offer information-theoretic security and
have polynomial complexity in the number of participants as well as in a safety parameter and, in
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the case of Theorem 4, in the number of bits in the transmitted message. In all cases, the expression
“exponentially close to 1” or “exponentially small” means “exponentially in the safety parameter”.
We also review a key result from [BCG+02].
Theorem 1 (Logical OR–[BT07]). There exists a secure multiparty protocol to compute the
logical OR of the participants’ input bits (one bit per participant). Misbehaving participants cannot
cause the protocol to abort. (Any refusal to participate when expected will cause the output to be 1.)
The correct answer is computed with probability exponentially close to 1. The only information an
active adversary can learn through the protocol is if at least one honest participant has input 1.
No information about the number of such participants or their identity is revealed.
Theorem 2 (Collision Detection–[BT07]). There exists a collision detection protocol in which
each participant inputs a bit. Let r denote the number of 1s among these input bits. The protocol
has three possible outcomes corresponding to whether r = 0, r = 1 or r ≥ 2. If all participants are
honest, the correct value is computed with probability exponentially close to 1. No participant can
make the protocol abort, and an adversary cannot learn more than it could have learned by assigning
to all corrupt participants the input 0 and letting them follow the protocol faithfully. A single corrupt
participant can cause the output corresponding to r ≥ 2 regardless of the other inputs (even if all
the other inputs are 0). Also, it is possible for a corrupt participant to set his input to 0 if all
other participants have input 0 (producing an r = 0 output) and to 1 otherwise (producing an r ≥ 2
output). No other form of cheating is possible.
Although the collision detection protocol outlined above may look rather imperfect, it is actually
just as useful as the ideal protocol for our purpose.
Theorem 3 (Notification–[BT07]). There exists a notification protocol in which participants can
notify other participants of their choosing. Each player’s output is one private bit specifying if he
has been notified at least once; this value is correctly computed with probability exponentially close
to 1. This is the only information accessible through the protocol even in the case of an active
adversary.
According to [BT07], it is possible in general to invoke the notification protocol even if multiple
senders want to notify several receivers. However, in the specific context of our use of this protocol
for the purpose of anonymous quantum message transmission, we forbid any honest participant to
engage in the above notification protocol without having previously caused output “r = 1” in the
collision detection protocol (Theorem 2). Similarly, no honest participant S will ever engage in the
anonymous message transmission protocol below unless he has initially caused output “r = 1” in the
collision detection protocol and has notified a single other participant R.
Theorem 4 (Anonymous Message Transmission–[BT07]). There exists an anonymous message
transmission protocol in which a sender S can transmit a classical message to a receiver R such
that the anonymity of S and R and the privacy of the message are perfect even in the presence of
an active adversary. If all participants are honest then the message is transmitted perfectly. Any
attempt by a corrupt participant to modify the message will cause the protocol to abort, except with
exponentially small probability.
In 2002, Howard Barnum, Claude Cre´peau, Daniel Gottesman and Alain Tapp presented a
non-interactive scheme for the authentication of quantum messages [BCG+02]. The protocol also
encrypts the quantum state to be transmitted and is information-theoretically secure.
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Theorem 5 (Quantum Authentication–[BCG+02]). There exists an information-theoretically
secure quantum authentication scheme to authenticate an arbitrary quantum message |ψ〉 of
length m with an encoding circuit (called authenticate) and a decoding circuit (called decode) of
size polynomial in m, which uses a random private key of length 2m+2s+1 and has authenticated
message of length m+s. Let p the probability that the message is accepted. If the message is accepted
then let q be the probability of obtaining outcome |ψ〉 when measuring in a basis containing |ψ〉.
If the authenticated message is not modified, then p = q = 1. Otherwise, pq+ (1− p) > 1− m+s
s(2s+1) .
The protocol also perfectly preserves the privacy of the transmitted message.
3 Protocol for anonymous quantum message transmission
In this section, we describe and analyse our protocol for anonymous quantum message transmission.
Our protocol allows an anonymous sender S to transmit an m-qubit message |ψ〉 to an anonymous
receiver R. We assume a broadcast channel as well as an information-theoretically secure private
and authenticated quantum channel between each pair of participants (which can also be used, of
course, to transmit classical information). Our protocol perfectly preserves the anonymity of the
sender and receiver, as well as the privacy of the message. The security proof for the protocol makes
no assumption on the number of corrupt participants. It is therefore not surprising that a single
participant can make the protocol abort. However, if the sender and the receiver are honest, the
quantum message to be transmitted will only be lost with exponentially small probability.
Here is an informal description of the protocol. In the first step, the purely classical collision
detection protocol of Theorem 2 is performed to establish that exactly one participant wants to
send an anonymous quantum message. If this is not the case, the protocol aborts. In case it is
found that more than one participant wants to speak, one might imagine alternative scenarios such
as asking each one of them to decide at random whether or not to skip their turn and trying again
the collision detection protocol until a single-sender occurrence occurs. This will reveal information
on the number of honest would-be senders and may take too many trials if there are too many of
them, so that more sophisticated solutions might need to be considered. (We do not elaborate on
this issue for simplicity.)
In the next two steps, the participants collaborate to establish multiple instances of a shared
state |+n〉 =
1√
2
|0n〉 + 1√
2
|1n〉. Then, the sender designates a receiver by use of the notification
protocol (Theorem 3). If honest, the receiver will act differently from the other participants, but in
a way that is indistinguishable, so that his anonymity is preserved. The shared instances of |+n〉
are then used to create anonymous entanglement between the sender and the receiver. However,
the anonymous entanglement could be imperfect if other participants misbehave. For this reason,
the sender then creates a sufficient number of instances of Bell state |Φ+〉. The possibly imperfect
anonymous entanglement is used to teleport [BBC+93] an authenticated version of half of each |Φ+〉.
If this first teleportation is successful, the sender uses this newly established perfect anonymous
entanglement to teleport the quantum message itself. Our fail-safe quantum teleportation protocol
ensures that unless the receiver is corrupt, the quantum message is never destroyed, except with
exponentially small probability: either it is safely transmitted to the receiver, or it comes back
intact at the sender’s.
In more detail, all classical communication from the sender to the receiver is performed anony-
mously using the anonymous message transmission protocol (Theorem 4). To create anonymous
entanglement, all participants must be involved. One participant (who is chosen arbitrarily, for
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instance the first participant in lexicographic order) creates a state |+n〉 and distributes one qubit
to each participant, keeping one for himself. Of course, this participant could be corrupt, so that
there is no guarantee that a proper |+n〉 has been distributed. Moreover, a corrupt distributor could
send different states to different honest participants, in the hope that the future evolution of the
protocol may depend on who is the sender and who is the receiver. Foiling this threat constitutes
a key contribution of our protocol. For this reason, all participants verify this state without de-
stroying it in the next step. If the verification succeeds, the state shared amongst all participants is
guaranteed to be invariant under permutation of the honest participants (Lemma 1), even though
it could still not be a genuine |+n〉 state. This ensures sender and receiver anonymity. Furthermore,
the behaviour of the state |+n〉, when measured by all but two parties in the Hadamard basis,
ensures correctness (unless is aborts) as shown in Theorems 6 and 8.
The full protocol is given as Protocol 1, where we denote by P the conditional phase change
defined by P |0〉 = |0〉 and P |1〉 = −|1〉. Note that if two participants (such as the sender and the
receiver) share an instance of Bell state |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
|00〉 − 1√
2
|11〉, a single participant (such as the
sender) can convert this to a |Φ+〉 by locally applying the P operation. Note also that such a local
operation (performed by the sender) has no detectable effect that could be measured by the other
participants (in particular the receiver), which ensures that the anonymity of the sender is not
compromised. It is easy to see that Protocol 1 has polynomial complexity in n (the number of
participants), s (the security parameter) and m (the length of the message).
Theorem 6 (Correctness). Assume all participants are honest in Protocol 1. If more than one
of them wishes to be a sender, this will be detected with probability exponentially close to 1 in the
first step. Otherwise, the message is transmitted perfectly with probability exponentially close to 1,
and the protocol can abort only with exponentially small probability.
Proof. Even if all participants are honest, it is possible for collision detection or notification to
produce an incorrect output (the notification protocol may also abort); however, this happens with
exponentially small probability.
To ensure correctness of the protocol, we only have to verify that S and R share a sufficient
number of proper Bell states |Φ+〉 at the end of step 5. It is clear that at the end of step 3, the
participants share proper instances of state |+n〉 (since we are assuming in this theorem that they
are honest). When S computes the parity of the measurement outcomes in step 5, this corresponds
to the parity of the measurement results in the Hadamard basis of the state |+n〉, where all but
two qubits are measured. If the parity is even, S and R share |Φ+〉 and otherwise |Φ−〉, which is
corrected by the sender by the application of the conditional phase change P . ⊓⊔
The following Lemma is necessary in the proof of anonymity and privacy (Theorem 7).
Lemma 1. In Protocol 1, if step 3 succeeds, then the state of the system at the end of the step is:
α|00 . . . 0〉H |ψ0〉C + β|11 . . . 1〉H |ψ1〉C , (1)
where H denotes the honest participants’ subsystem, C denotes the corrupt participants’ subsystem,
and α, β ∈ C are such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
Proof. In the entanglement verification step, each honest participant sends a pseudo-copy of his
state to every other honest participant. Therefore, after a single honest participant verifies that his
qubits are in the subspace spanned by {|0n〉, |1n〉}, we are already ensured that if the entanglement
verification succeeds, the state will be of the form given above. ⊓⊔
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Protocol 1 Anonymous quantum message transmission
Let s be the security parameter and m be the length of quantum message |ψ〉. All quantum communication is
performed using the private authenticated quantum channels.
1. Multiple Sender Detection
1.1 The collision detection protocol (Theorem 2) is used to determine if one and only one participant wants to
be the sender. If not, the protocol aborts.
2. Entanglement Distribution
2.1 One arbitrarily designated participant creates 2m+ s instances of the state |+n〉 and sends one qubit of each
instance to each participant, keeping one qubit of each instance for himself.
3. Entanglement Verification
For each of the 2m + s instances:
3.1 Each participant makes n− 1 pseudo-copies of his qubit by applying a control-not with it as the source and
a qubit initialized to |0〉 as the target. One such pseudo-copy is sent to every other participant.
3.2 Each participant verifies that all the n qubits in his possession are in the subspace spanned by {|0n〉, |1n〉}.
3.3 Each participant broadcasts the outcome of the previous step. If any outcome is negative, the protocol aborts.
3.4 Each participant resets n − 1 of his qubits to |0〉 by performing n − 1 control-not operations. These qubits
are discarded and the one remaining is back to the state distributed at step 2.
4. Receiver Notification
4.1 The participants execute the notification protocol (Theorem 3) in which only S notifies a single R.
5. Anonymous Entanglement Generation
For each of the 2m + s instances:
5.1 All participants except S and R measure in the Hadamard basis the qubit that remains from step 3.
5.2 Each participant broadcasts the result of his measurement (S and R broadcast two random dummy bits).
5.3 S computes the parity of all the bits received during the previous step (except his own and that of R).
5.4 If the parity is odd, S applies P , the conditional phase change, to his remaining qubit
(the two qubits shared by S and R are now in Bell state |Φ+〉).
6. Perfect Anonymous Entanglement
6.1 S creates 2m instances of Bell state |Φ+〉. He keeps the first qubit of each pair; let ρ be the rest of the pairs.
6.2 S creates a random classical key k of length 4m+ 2s+ 1, and computes ρ′ = authenticate(ρ, k).
6.3 S performs a teleportation measurement on ρ′ using the anonymous |Φ+〉 states generated during steps 2–5.
6.4 S uses the anonymous message transmission protocol (Theorem 4) to send k and the teleportation bits to R.
6.5 R completes the teleportation and computes ρ = decode(ρ′, k). If the decoding is successful, S and R share
perfect anonymous entanglement (they share 2m instances of |Φ+〉).
6.6 A logical OR is computed (Theorem 1): all players input 0 except R, who inputs 1 if the authentication failed
and 0 otherwise. If the outcome is 1, the protocol aborts.
7. Fail-Safe Teleportation
7.1 S teleports the state |ψ〉 to R using the firstm pairs generated in the previous step. The teleportation bits are
anonymously transmitted to R (Theorem 4). If the communication succeeds, R terminates the teleportation.
7.2 A logical OR is performed (Theorem 1): all players input 0 except R, who inputs 1 if the communication of
the teleportation bits failed. If the outcome is 0, the protocol succeeds. Otherwise, S and R do the following:
7.2.1 R performs a teleportation measurement using the remaining perfect anonymous entanglement to teleport
back to S the quantum state resulting from partially failed step 7.1.
7.2.2 All participants broadcast 2m random bits, except R who broadcasts the teleportation bits from above.
The protocol continues even if one of the participants refuses to broadcast.
7.2.3 S reconstructs |ψ〉 from his own teleportation bits from step 7.1 and R’s teleportation bits received from
the broadcast. The protocol aborts.
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Theorem 7 (Anonymity and Privacy). In Protocol 1, regardless of the number of corrupt
participants, the anonymity of sender S and receiver R are always perfect. The privacy of the
transmitted message |ψ〉 is perfect, except with exponentially small probability.
Proof. We analyse the protocol step by step in order to prove the statement.
By virtue of Theorem 2, step 1 does not compromise the identity of the sender, and it involves
neither the receiver nor the quantum state to be transmitted. Steps 2 and 3 are done without any
reference to S or R and thus cannot compromise their anonymity either. Furthermore, the state
obtained at the end of step 3 (if it does not abort) cannot be specifically correlated with any honest
participant even if some other participants are corrupt. More precisely, by Lemma 1, the state is
invariant under any permutation of the honest participants. This is crucial for the anonymity and
privacy of the rest of the protocol. In particular, it guarantees that the probability that the protocol
aborts does not depend on the identity of S or R. We prove this below in the analysis of step 6.
The security of step 4 follows directly from the unconditional security of the notification protocol
(Theorem 3). However, if S fails to notify R in step 4 (this happens with exponentially small
probability), an adversary can surreptitiously take over the role of the honest receiver in the rest
of the protocol without being detected. In that case, the adversary will violate the secrecy of the
transmitted state, yet without compromising the sender and receiver anonymity.
In step 5, anonymous entanglement is generated. No information is revealed to the adversary
in this step since all communication is done by honest participants broadcasting random bits.
For step 6, all communication is done using the anonymous message transmission protocol, which
is secure according to Theorem 4, except in logical OR computation at the end, which reveals the
success or failure of the authentication part of the protocol. We now show that this last substep
cannot reveal any information on the identity of S or R. This is because the success or failure of
the authentication step is uncorrelated to the identity of S and R: by Lemma 1, as far as the qubits
are concerned, all honest participants are identical under permutation. Thus the adversary has no
strategy that would allow him to determine any information about the identity of S or R.
During step 7, all the bits sent from S to R are randomly and uniformly distributed because
they are the classical bits resulting from the teleportation protocol, therefore they do not reveal
any information about the identity of S. A similar observation about the bits broadcast by R in the
case that the very last part of the protocol is executed ensures that R and S remain anonymous.
The privacy of the state |ψ〉 in the case that S successfully notified R in step 4 (which happens
with probability exponentially close to 1) is guaranteed by the basic properties of teleportation. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. At the end of Protocol 1, if R is honest then the state |ψ〉 is either in the possession
of S or R, except with exponentially small probability. Furthermore, |ψ〉 can only stay with S if the
protocol has aborted.
Proof. If all participants are honest, then by Theorem 6, the state is in the possession of R except
with exponentially small probability. Otherwise, the protocol might abort before step 7, in which
case S still has |ψ〉. If the protocol reaches step 7, due to the quantum authentication of step 6,
S and R share 2m perfect Bell states |Φ+〉 (with probability exponentially close to 1), which are
used for teleportation in step 7. If the first step of the fail-safe teleportation fails, then S no
longer has |ψ〉; however, the last three substeps of the protocol will always succeed and S will
reconstruct |ψ〉 (provided R is honest). Furthermore, it follows from the virtues of teleportation
that if the protocol does not abort, the state is no longer with S. ⊓⊔
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The reason why we specify in Theorem 8 that R must be honest is that a corrupt R can
destroy |ψ〉 by simply discarding it after having faithfully followed the entire protocol. There remains
one subtlety to mention: a corrupt R could behave honestly until the last step. Then, he would
input 1 in the logical OR computation to force S to accept the teleportation back of the state.
At that point, the corrupt R could teleport back to S a fake state. As a result, S would be fooled
into thinking he still has custody of the original quantum state when, in fact, that state is in the
hands of R. (In general, there will be no way for S to know that this has happened.)
4 Conclusion and discussion
We have presented the first information-theoretically secure protocol for quantum communication
between an anonymous sender and an anonymous receiver that tolerates an arbitrary number of
corrupt participants. In particular, this means that no adversary can learn any information that
will break the anonymity of the sender or receiver. Our protocol also provides perfect privacy
for the quantum message and ensures that the quantum message is never destroyed, except with
exponentially small probability. The drawback of our protocol is that any participant can disrupt
the protocol and make it abort.
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